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Abstract 
Most economic analyses of international climate policies are based on the assumption of 
a single global decision maker, who acts as a “benevolent dictator”. In reality, such a 
global decision maker does not exist, and international climate policy will have to be 
formulated on the basis of voluntary cooperation in the form of an International Climate 
Agreement (ICA). Recent developments on non-cooperative game theory, especially in 
the field of coalition formation, can provide insight in the incentives of regions to col-
laborate in an ICA. Before a full integration of the methodology of coalition formation 
and stability can be achieved, a number of obstacles have to be overcome. This report 
discusses these obstacles and formulates which steps can be taken to improve the analy-
sis of international climate policy. 
Specifically, this report explores options to integrate the STACO (STAbility of COali-
tions) model (www.enr.wur.nl/UK/staco/) with the FAIR (Framework to Assess Interna-
tional Regimes for differentiation of commitments) model and the MERGE (Model for 
Estimating the Regional and Global Effects of greenhouse gas reductions) model in or-
der to provide an assessment of stability of International Climate Agreements based on 
existing estimates and projections of climate impacts. The report identifies policy rele-
vant questions that call for further research.
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Most economic analyses of international climate policy are based on the assumption of a 
single global decision maker, who acts as a “benevolent dictator”. The current generation 
Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) virtually all assume that countries or regions1 
have either no interest in cooperation at all (usually labelled the “non-cooperative solu-
tion”) or that all regions want to collaborate (the “cooperative solution”), and some mod-
els do not even consider these two extremes. In reality, such a global decision maker 
does however not exist, and international climate policy will have to be formulated on 
the basis of voluntary cooperation in the form of an International Climate Agreement 
(ICA), as for example the Kyoto Protocol. While negotiations on a new climate agree-
ment are ongoing, it is unlikely that the result will be either full global cooperation or no 
agreement at all. This makes the concept of a “partial agreement” highly relevant from a 
policy perspective. 
Recent developments on non-cooperative game theory, especially in the field of coalition 
formation, can provide insight in the incentives of regions to collaborate in a partial 
agreement. Most of these game-theoretic models use the concept of a “partial agreement 
Nash equilibrium” (Chander and Tulkens 1992). This concept assumes a binding con-
tract can be formulated, but that such a contract will only be signed (and ratified) when 
this is in the interest on the region. For identical players, Barrett (1994) showed that only 
small coalitions can be stable if the potential gains from cooperation are large. To under-
stand this result notice that as the gains from cooperation increase, the incentives for re-
gions to deviate (or “free-ride”) also increase. More recent studies highlight the role of 
the design of the agreement on stability, for example the role of restricted membership 
and the role of financial transfers to compensate regions for their mitigation efforts. The 
conclusion from these studies is that well-designed contracts can stimulate cooperation 
and increase the stability of partial coalitions, but that global cooperation is likely to be 
unattainable because of the huge free-rider incentives. 
Before a full integration of the methodology of coalition formation and stability can be 
achieved, a number of obstacles have to be overcome. This report discusses these obsta-
cles and formulates which steps can be taken to improve the analysis of international 
climate policy. By confronting the restrictions of the current generation of game-
theoretic models with the restrictions of the current generation IAMs, a tentative research 
agenda will be formulated. After all, it seems evident that an improved insight into the 
incentives of regions to participate in international agreements is essential. 
 
                                                   
1  As most models aggregate countries in regions, we will use the term regions from now on, 
even though a region can in principle consist of one country. 
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1.2 Scope and setup of the report 
The project aims to provide an exploration of the current state of the art in research on 
the economic incentives of regions to engage in international climate policies, with spe-
cial attention to the formation and stability of international climate agreements using In-
tegrated Assessment Models. The first part of the report focuses of the most recent in-
sights from the game-theoretic literature, and provides an overview of the implications 
for international climate policy making. International climate policies are shaped in an 
ongoing negotiation process. Coalition theory has been employed to explore conditions 
to reach a stable International Climate Agreement (ICA) and to identify barriers to effec-
tive cooperation. This work is partly purely theoretical and partly applied to investigate 
in ‘small’ empirically calibrated models the impacts of certain design features, such as 
transfers and restricted membership, on the stability of coalitions. This part will rely to a 
large extent on the insights of the ongoing research programme of Wageningen Univer-
sity, the STACO model. 
The second part of the report uses these insights and explores the limitations of the cur-
rent IAMs. Decision making assumptions in the most important models will be dis-
cussed. It also provides the necessary embedding of the two main models that are inves-
tigated in this report, FAIR and MERGE. The FAIR model, with its simple and flexible 
structure, offers an excellent setting for investigating different assumptions with respect 
to the costs and benefits of climate policies. This can be used to assess the incentives of 
regions to collaborate and thus explore the stability of climate coalitions. The MERGE 
model is one of the leading models for the analysis of optimal climate policy, and con-
tains elaborate information on the costs and benefits of climate policy for different re-
gions. By introducing coalition formation in this model, a rich image can be projected on 
the possibilities and pitfalls of integrating game-theoretic methodology in complex 
IAMs. 
Introducing partial collaboration in these IAMs does not only provide a more detailed 
answer to existing policy questions, but can also shed light on a new set of policy ques-
tions, especially those related to the formation and stability of climate coalitions. This 
report will also deal with the possibilities to assess the ways in which incentives of re-
gions to be part of an ambitious international climate policy are affected by related is-
sues. One can think of local air pollution or energy security, which provide local benefits 
to mitigation, and adaptation, which provides a local alternative to mitigation. These re-
lated issues do not only affect the optimal level of mitigation as assessed by the current 
generation IAMS, they may also crucially influence the incentives of regions to collabo-
rate. And finding ways to stabilise a larger coalition may imply substantial improve-
ments in terms of the global ambition level for mitigation. 
Section 2 of the report surveys the main streams of the literature in coalition theory as far 
as they are considered relevant also for applied modelling. Section 3 then describes a 
quickscan of the most relevant applied models, and thus puts the models discussed in the 
later chapters in perspective. Next, Chapter 4 deals with the prospects for coalition for-
mation in FAIR and MERGE. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Economics of International Environmental Agreements 
This section provides an overview of different model variants to study International En-
vironmental Agreements (IEAs). We first explain basic concepts and a base type model 
(2.1). We go on to explain some general results from the base model (2.2) and discuss 
several extensions and there impacts on participation and success (2.3). Finally we dis-
cuss refinements of solution concepts (2.4).     
2.1 Basic concepts 
In game theory the issue of coalition stability has for long remained exclusively a topic 
of cooperative game theory. Cooperative game theory assumes that players can make 
binding agreements. Full compliance with an agreement is always assumed, hence moni-
toring and enforcement are not considered. The focus of cooperative game theory is the 
stability of the grand coalition, the coalition of all players. The most prominent solution 
concept is the core. An outcome (a vector specifying the payoffs of all players) is in the 
core if no coalition can improve their payoff upon what they receive according to that 
outcome (i.e. what they receive in the grand coalition).  
By contrast non-cooperative game theory does not assume the possibility of binding 
agreements. Usually monitoring and enforcement are important issues and the most 
prominent solution concept is Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium each player 
adopts a strategy that is a best response to what other players are doing. Generally, there 
is nothing that guarantees that full cooperation is a Nash equilibrium, i.e. the Nash equi-
librium will usually not be Pareto-efficient. Traditionally non-cooperative game theory 
has paid little attention to the issue of coalition formation.  
Given cooperative game theory’s focus on the grand coalition and non-cooperative game 
theory’s neglect of coalition formation, a new class of games emerged in the early 1990s 
specifically designed to study partial coalitions. A prominent area of application of these 
games are IEAs; see e.g. Hoel (1992), Cararro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994). 
These games, which we call IEA-games in what follows, are hybrids of cooperative and 
non-cooperative games.  Players who are members of a coalition can make binding 
agreements. However, the participation decision is modelled as a non-cooperative game 
and, hence,  the analysis is not confined to the grand coalition but also considers partial 
coalitions. An IEA is usually a partial agreement comprising a subset of the set of play-
ers. The grand coalition and no coalition are just specific cases in this more general set-
up. Usually only a single coalition is considered and these games are referred to as cartel 
games. The signatories of an agreement, the coalition, play a non-cooperative game 
against non-signatories. More precisely, an IEA-game is a two-stage game where  in the 
first stage players sign an IEA; in the second stage the coalition of players who signed 
act jointly and play an abatement game against all other players who act independently. 
The Nash equilibrium of the second stage game is called a Partial Agreement Nash Equi-
librium (PANE) (Chander and Tulkens 1997). The PANE payoffs provide a γ-
characteristic function that assigns a payoff for each possible coalition and the respective 
singleton players. The γ-characteristic function amended with a sharing rule of the coali-
tion payoff among members serves as a base for the study of incentives of individual 
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players to join or not to join the IEA. This determines the equilibria of the first stage. 
The equilibria are called stable coalitions. The stability feature – that no player wants to 
change her strategy, given what other players are doing – can be decomposed into exter-
nal stability and internal stability. More formally, consider a set N of individual countries 
i N∈ . Payoffs that accrue depend on the coalition formed K N⊆ . Payoffs are deter-
mined from costs and benefits of equilibrium abatement of GHGs in an abatement game. 
Note that GHG abatement is a public good. It is well known for public goods games that 
the grand coalition K N=  is efficient, while any partial agreement with K N⊂  is not 
(e.g. Dasgupta 1982). In a public goods game a singleton coalition { }K i=  will not be 
effective and give the same payoffs as K = ∅ . We will refer to both cases as ‘all-
singletons’. To be more precise about payoffs, the abatement game invokes a partition 
function ( )V K  that determines payoffs KV  for the coalition and for each singleton 
player ( )jV K , j K∉ . Before we can introduce the notion of stability in a more formal 
way, we need to define individual payoffs for coalition members. We assume that some 
sharing rule r applies that distributes the coalition payoff ( )KV K among members. Thus 
we arrive at a per-member partition function, also called a valuation function. For con-
venience we denote it by ( )rV K ; individual payoffs under coalition K when sharing rule 
r applies are denoted by ( )riV K . Of course, for every sharing rule r we have 
( ) ( )rK i
i K
V K V K
∈
= ∑ .  We adopt the shorthand notation iK−  for \{ }K i  with i K∈  and 
jK+  for { }K j∪  with j K∉ . Define the coalition surplus ( ) ( )K K i i
i K
S V K V K−
∈
≡ − ∑ . 
Stability is defined as follows:        
DEFINITION 1  A coalition K  is stable under sharing rule r if it is  
a) Internally stable, i.e.  
 ( ) ( )ri i iV K V K−≥  for all i K∈ ,  
and 
b) Externally stable, i.e.  
 ( ) ( )rj j jV K V K+≥  for all \j N K∈ .2      
Alternative solution concepts relevant for coalition games are briefly discussed in section 
2.4 below. 
2.2 The ICA base model 
The work on International Climate Agreements (ICAs) is part of a larger body of litera-
ture on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). The broader literature on IEAs 
offers many relevant insights. Two features are, however specific to the climate problem:  
                                                   
2  The tie-breaking rule is here that a player would join the coalition if she is indifferent be-
tween joining and staying out. Hence, by this definition, the empty set ∅  is not externally 
stable, and a trivial coalition is internally stable. 
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a) That greenhouse gases are a stock pollutant and  
b) That greenhouse gas abatement is a global public good. 
The valuation function ( )rV K  which is decisive for the stability of ICAs is usually gen-
erated by a transboundary pollution game (e.g. Barrett 1994, Chander and Tulkens 
1997). In general, the strategic situation in transboundary pollution game is determined 
by upstream/downstream position of countries captured in a transport matrix (Mäler 
1989, Folmer and v. Mouche 2000). In the case of greenhouse gases, a uniformly mixing 
pollutant, all elements of the transport matrix are 1 and countries are symmetric with re-
spect to the upstream/downstream aspect. Consequently, a transport matrix does not 
show up explicitly in the formal model and the game is a pure public goods game. 
Two types of base models can be found in the literature: (i) the first considers private 
benefits from pollutive production and (public) damages from emissions; (ii) the second 
considers benefits and costs of abatement. Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2006) have 
shown that type (i) models can be translated to type (ii) models. Hence, we restrict the 
following exposition to models of type (ii) where abatement is the choice variable. More 
specifically, following specifications adopted for the STACO model, consider all regions 
Ni ∈  adopt their abatement strategies simultaneously. The abatement strategy space of 
a region is defined as [ ]itit eq ,0∈ , where ite denotes regional emission levels in the busi-
ness-as-usual (BAU) scenario with no abatement. Consider a planning horizon of T 
years. Each region obtains benefits itb  which depend on global emission reductions and 
bears costs itc  which depend on the emission reduction by the region itself. itb  is a con-
cave benefit function of past and current global abatement in period t, and itc  is a convex 
abatement cost function of regional current abatement. Benefit and abatement cost func-
tions are specified in detail below  The payoff for each region iπ is defined as follows: 
 { }1
1
π ( ) (1 ) ( ( ,..., ) ( ))ti it t it it
t
b q q c q
∞ −
=
= + ρ ⋅ −∑q  (2.1)
where the model horizon accounting for future benefits is infinity, ρ is the discount rate, 
q  is an abatement matrix of dimension N × T. 3  The right hand side of equation 2.1 is 
the net present value of the stream of payoffs. Following Bloch (1997), we assume that 
signatories and singletons play a Nash equilibrium with regard to their abatement strate-
gies, which is also called a partial agreement Nash equilibrium between the coalition and 
the remaining singletons (Chander and Tulkens, 1995 and 1997). Once a coalition is 
formed, regions play an abatement game. We assume that regions which join a coali-
tion NK ⊆  set their abatement level by maximising the sum of the payoffs of the signa-
tories taking the abatement levels of non-signatories as given. Non-signatories 
Ki ∉ choose their abatement level by maximising their own payoffs taking the other re-
gions’ abatement levels as given. This abatement game has a unique interior solution un-
der the STACO specification of benefit and cost functions (see below). When coalition 
K  is formed, the optimal solution of the abatement game is denoted by )(K*iq . Hence, 
                                                   
3  We adopt the common notation where subscripts are dropped to denote aggregation over that 
index. 
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the uniqueness of the solution enables us to rewrite payoffs which are functions of the 
abatement paths as payoffs which are functions of the coalition structure. Moreover, 
transfer schemes are applied among the signatories. A financial transfer )(KFi is imple-
mented among the signatories, such that 0=∑
∈Ki
iF . Therefore, we obtain a valuation 
function )(KVi  which assigns the payoff to every region Ni ∈  given the coalition K . 
The payoffs of non-signatories and the payoffs of signatories are defined as follows: 
 { }∑∞
=
− −⋅+≡
1
* ))()(()1()(
t
*
iitit
t
i cbrKV qq    for  Ki ∉ , (2.2)
 { } )())()(()1()(
1
KFcbrKV i
t
*
iitit
t
i +−⋅+≡ ∑∞
=
− qq*      for  Ki ∈  , (2.3)
where { }( ) ( )i iV V j∅ =  for all Nji ∈, , and *q  denotes the equilibrium abatement.  
This base model considers the stability of a single IEA with a stock pollutant. Barrett 
(1994) has analysed the case with no transfers and symmetric countries for a set of dif-
ferent benefits and cost functions. Barrett’s findings can be summarised in the following 
table: 
Table 2.1 Size of IEAs for different payoff specifications with symmetric players. 
Payoff type Benefits Abatement costs Number of signatories 
Linear-
quadratic a)  linear quadratic   3 
Linear loga-
rithmic linear logarithmic   2 
Linear-
cubicb)  linear cubic   2 
Quadratic-
linear c) quadratic linear   1 
 
Quadratic-
quadratic 
 
quadratic quadratic 
Few when gains of cooperation are 
large; 
Many when gains of cooperation are 
small 
Notes: a) There is no leakage in this type of payoff function; b) STACO specification, not con-
sidered by Barrett (1994) c) There is full leakage in this type of payoff function. 
A general conclusion from these findings is that one cannot expect successful stable 
IEAs for global problems when there are many equal players. The free-rider incentives 
are particularly strong if there is leakage, i.e. additional abatement by a group of signato-
ries is (partially or fully) offset by addional emissions of of non-signatories.  
2.3 Options to stabilise more ambitious coalitions 
More recent work on the stability of ICAs has explored different options to stabilise lar-
ger and more successful coalitions. It is apparent from this work (e.g. Botteon and 
Carraro 1997, Weikard et al. 2006, Carraro et al. 2006) that exploiting the asymmetries 
between countries is a key issue. In particular, differences in abatement costs between 
countries open the possibility of carbon trade. Abatement can take place where it is 
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cheapest while abating countries receive compensation for costs. Thus, international 
transfers (or side-payments) are generated that can enhance the stability of a coalition. 
We will address the issue of transfers first. But in addition other issues have been studied 
which have led to refinements and amendments of the base model sketched above.   
In the remainder of this section we provide an overview of issues with some selected re-
sults. We address the following:  
• Transfers 
• Access rules 
• Technological change and technology cooperation 
• Uncertainty and learning 
• Renegotiations 
The section closes with a table providing numerical results from STACO. These give an 
indication of the effects of institutional designs (such as transfers and renegotiations) and 
developments (such as technological change and learning) on coalition stability 
2.3.1 Transfers and side-payments 
In the literature on the formation and stability of international environmental agreements 
(IEAs) it has been emphasised that transfers will strengthen incentives to join. Two main 
insights have been established. First, if countries are identical, transfers will not be effec-
tive (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993). If countries differ in costs and benefits of pollution 
abatement, transfers can be used to buy the cooperation of countries with low marginal 
costs of abatement. Hence, agreements between countries with large marginal abatement 
benefits and countries with low marginal abatement costs will be particularly successful 
(Barrett 2001, Weikard et al. 2006a). Second, it is evident from a number of studies that 
incentives to join an IEA will be very sensitive to the design of the transfer rule (e.g. 
Botteon and Carraro 1997, Tol 2001, Carraro et al. 2006, Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus 
2006, Weikard et al. 2006a). Carraro et al. (2006) provide a comparison of different 
transfer schemes with respect to participation incentives, global welfare and abatement.  
Here we provide a comparison of different transfer schemes based on the STACO model 
Our analysis employs the two-stage cartel game introduced in section 2.1. The first stage 
is an announcement game where players (regions) choose to sign or not to sign an IEA. 
The signatories and the remaining singletons then play a non-cooperative abatement 
game where the signatories maximise joint welfare at the second stage. This establishes a 
‘partial agreement Nash equilibrium’ (Chander and Tulkens 1995). A stable agreement is 
a Nash equilibrium of the announcement game where payoffs are derived from the 
(unique) second stage equilibrium and a transfer scheme.  
Following Rose et al. (1998) allocation-based and outcome-based transfer schemes can 
be distinguished. The former implement transfers by distributing emission permits, the 
latter distribute gains from cooperation. Looking at allocation-based rules where coali-
tion members receive tradable emission permits, Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) 
have investigated the impact of different permit distribution schemes, for example distri-
bution according to population, ability to pay and initial emissions (based on grand-
fathering). Their finding is that only a grandfathering scheme can stabilise a non-trivial 
coalition of at least two members. However, they note that coalitions are small, consist-
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ing of no more than three members, and do little to improve greenhouse gas abatement. 
These results are derived for an essentially static model. For dynamically optimal emis-
sion paths and a grandfathering scheme of permits based on projections of future emis-
sions the incentives to participate in a climate agreement improve, particularly for coun-
tries that expect large emission growth in the future; cf. Böhringer and Lange (2005). 
Nagashima et al. (2009) investigate this issue using an updated version of the STACO 
model, and compare different transfer schemes. They find that static grandfathering of 
emission permits may lead to counterintuitive international transfer flows, as fast-
growing economies such as China have a sharply increasing demand for permits. 
Permit trading – although prominent among policy-makers – does not guarantee the best 
incentives for participation. Outcome-based rules that distribute not emission permits but 
the gains from cooperation are in general superior. The public goods character of green-
house gas abatement implies that enlarging a coalition always improves the payoffs. This 
superadditivity condition allows that each coalition member receives at least the non-
cooperative payoff. If an ad-hoc rule that distributes the coalition surplus proportional to 
(initial and future) emissions is introduced better incentives for membership and larger 
coalitions can be observed.  
Transfer design can be improved even further. Relevant for the participation decision of 
a country are the country’s share of the coalition payoff and its outside-option payoff. 
Hence, if the coalition payoff is distributed in such a way that each member gets at least 
its outside-option payoff, then no incentives to leave a given coalition remain. This con-
cept is elaborated by Fuentes-Albero and Rubio (2005), Carraro et al. (2006), McGinty 
(2007) and Weikard (2009). Weikard (2009) has shown that surplus sharing according to 
outside option payoffs internally stabilises all coalitions that are possibly stable under 
any sharing rule. Hence, this set of coalitions includes one that cannot be improved upon. 
Therefore, it can be referred to as ‘optimal sharing’. It is important to note here that the 
public goods character of abatement gives rise to positive spillovers. If a coalition forms, 
it will not reap all the gains from cooperation, as singletons will also benefit from in-
creased abatement. Positive spillovers provide incentives to free-ride and they are larger 
for larger coalitions. Hence, a grand coalition that would internalise all externalities and 
implement efficient abatement will be faced with large outside option payoffs and will 
usually not be stable. Nagashima et al. (2009) use the STACO model to investigate the 
potentially stable coalitions using optimal transfers and compare these results to other 
transfer schemes. Results from the STACO model for different transfer schemes are pre-
sented in the summary table (Table 2.2) below, drawing upon Nagashima et al. (2009).  
2.3.2 Access rules 
The Kyoto Protocol is an agreement open to all. Countries are free to join or not. Open 
membership seems in line with evidence on IEAs in general. Almost all protocols of ma-
jor IEAs have no provision that restricts membership. Moreover, intuition and results of 
the public goods literature suggest that global welfare increases with participation in an 
agreement and therefore any restriction on membership would hamper the effectiveness 
of IEAs. However, those results have been derived without considering the restriction 
that IEAs have to be self-enforcing. Hence, in the presence of free-rider incentives, it 
seems worthwhile to study the effect on coalition formation when membership is re-
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stricted. For instance from the empirical study of Botteon and Carraro (1997) on global 
warming it appears that some coalitions are internally but not externally stable. This 
suggests that some of these coalitions could be stabilized if coalition members had the 
opportunity to deny accession of new potential entrants. Moreover, recent theoretical re-
sults by Finus and Rundshagen (2003) obtained from a general framework suggest that 
exclusive membership may help to stabilize IEAs. The reason is that - though still inter-
nal instability poses a problem to IEAs - external instability is less of a problem because 
members of an IEA under exclusive membership can better control the accession of non-
signatories that may upset a coalition equilibrium. However, Finus and Rundshagen 
(2003) point out that it is not possible to conclude at a general level what “more stabil-
ity” means in terms of the success of IEAs. Therefore, the implications of exclusive 
membership in terms of global welfare and global emissions and stock of greenhouse 
gases matter. We report STACO results on two exclusive membership rules: (i) simple 
majority voting (ii) unanimity voting cf. Finus, Altamirano-Cabrera and Van Ierland 
(2005). The latter implies that each member can block the entry of any additonal coun-
try. 
First, note that all coalitions stable under open-membership are also stable under simple 
majority voting and all coalitions stable under simple majority voting are also stable un-
der unanimity voting. The empirical results of Finus et al. (2005) show that more and 
larger coalitions can be stabilised. Whereas no non-trivial coalition is stable under open 
membership, one non-trivial coalition is stable under exclusive membership and majority 
voting and two other additional coalitions are stable under unanimity voting. However, a 
more interesting fact is that those additional coalitions are superior in net benefit and in 
environmental terms. The findings are report in the summary table (Table 2.2) below.  
2.3.3 Technological change 
The long time horizon of the climate change problem calls for the inclusion of techno-
logical change into considerations of coalition stability. Studies by Weyant and Olavson 
(1999), Löschel (2002) and Clarke et al. (2008) provide an overview of the different 
sources of Technological Change (TC) and illustrations of how these are implemented in 
different energy and economic models of responses to climate change. Three main 
sources of TC can be defined: (i) R&D investment (Goulder and Mathai 2000, and 
Buonanno et al. 2003), (ii) R&D spillovers (Griliches 1992, and Bosetti et al. 2008), and 
(iii) learning by doing (Manne and Richels 2004, and Castelnuovo et al. 2005).  
Nordhaus (2002) incorporates endogenous TC into his DICE-99 model: the R&DICE 
model. The original DICE-99 model is a global model that assumes exogenous Hicks 
neutral TC in the production function; a reduction in carbon intensity (carbon emissions 
per unit of output) is achieved by substitution of capital and labor inputs for carbon en-
ergy. On the other hand, the R&DICE model assumes that an improvement in carbon in-
tensity is driven by technological change via R&D inputs into the energy sector, and this 
“carbon-energy-saving technological change” is finally embedded in the emission func-
tion. In the R&DICE model, a price increase for carbon energy will induce firms to in-
vest in new knowledge by developing environmentally-friendly new processes and prod-
ucts which will lead to lower emissions. Nordhaus concludes that the substitution effect 
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as present in the DICE-99 model is likely to be larger than the effect of ITC on CO2 
abatements, mainly due to the small social returns to R&D. 
The studies that have investigated the role of TC on coalition formation and stability are 
few. Buonanno et al. (2003) use an endogenous environmental technical change model 
called  ETC RICE model with six regions to study the case of a “Kyoto” agreement 
without or with emission permit trading among Annex I or worldwide where regions 
play a non-cooperative Nash game. TC is specified in three ways: (i) endogenous tech-
nological change and exogenous environmental technological change (the stock of 
knowledge is a production factor), (ii) endogenous technological change and policy-
induced environmental technological change (R&D affects both productivity and the 
emission-output ratio), (iii) technological spillovers. In their model, a stock of knowl-
edge is accumulated over time through R&D investment and it is embodied in a produc-
tion function and the emission-output ratio. Endogenous TC is driven by regional spill-
overs within sectors and increasing returns to scale from human capital. In Buonanno et 
al. the incentive to invest in R&D depends on regional marginal costs and the option of 
emission trading. The region with lowest marginal abatement costs has a strong incentive 
to carry out R&D to maximize social welfare by selling emission permits. The presence 
of spillovers leads to an increase of incentives to free-ride, thus the overall R&D efforts 
are reduced. 
In the context of linkage of climate control with increased R&D expenditures, Kemfert 
(2004) examines incentives for cooperation and stability of all possible coalitions by us-
ing a world integrated assessment model (WIAGEM) with four regions. ITC is defined 
in a way that an increase in R&D investments leads to an improvement in energy effi-
ciency (an increase in energy productivity). Kemfert concludes that incentives to join a 
coalition tend to be stronger in the case of cooperation on both climate control and tech-
nological innovation than in the absence of cooperation, due to lower abatement costs 
which brings higher profits. In addition, issue linkage increases incentives to join a coali-
tion. 
Tol et al. (2000) examine the role of the issue linkage with restricted technology diffu-
sion for stabilising a larger climate coalition in which abatement-specific technologies 
are developed by learning-by-doing or R&D investments in a similar framework as 
Goulder and Mathai (2000). Tol et al. conclude that the threat of restricting technology 
diffusion may prevent the coalition member from deviating, however, the coalition may 
lose by restricting technology diffusion. The effectiveness of the restriction increases 
with the size of the coalition. 
Nagashima and Dellink (2008) examine the stbility of international climate agreements 
in the presence of exogenous technological change and spillovers. In their model TC im-
plies declining abatement cost and technological spillovers imply that innovations in one 
region will trigger innovations elsewhere. Using the STACO model for a scenario where 
spillovers are stronger between coalition members, Nagashima and Dellink (2008) find 
that while technology spillovers increase global abatement and welfare they do not help 
to stabilise larger coalitions. Nagashima and Weikard (2009) examine the the link be-
tween R&D investment to improve abatement technologies and the incentives to join an 
ICA. Their finding is that on the one hand coalition formation will drive investment pat-
tern, but on the other hand investment opportunities will affect abatement costs and 
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therefore the willingness to join an ICA. Comparing models of exogenous and endoge-
nous TC, the latter will concentrate R&D investments and TC in regions that are charac-
terised by low marginal abatement costs such as China and India. Endogenous TC gives 
larger payoffs to any given coalition compared to exogenous TC, however the best stable 
coalition does not reap a higher percentage of what a grand coalition would gain. The 
latter result is also reported in Table 2.2 below. 
2.3.4 Uncertainty and learning 
Recently, Na and Shin 1998, Ulph 2004, Kolstad and Ulph 2006, Kolstad 2007 and Del-
link et al. (2008) have studied coalition formation under uncertainty and learning. They 
assume uncertainty about parameter values of the payoff function where probability dis-
tribution functions are assumed to be known to all regions. In the climate coalition for-
mation game, where countries choose their membership in the first stage and their 
abatement strategies in the second stage, Kolstad and Ulph (2006) and Kolstad (2007) 
distinguish three cases: (i) Uncertainty is resolved before the first stage. This corre-
sponds to the case of full learning. (ii) Uncertainty is resolved after the first stage but be-
fore the second stage. This corresponds to the case of partial learning. (iii) Uncertainty 
is never resolved. This is the case with no learning. In the modelling approach of Kol-
stad and Ulph (2006) learning takes the form of perfect learning, i.e. all players learn the 
true values of all uncertain parameters. All papers in this domain are stylised models 
with ex-ante identical players, except Dellink et al. (2008). The general conclusion is 
that learning has a negative impact on the success of coalition formation. Na and Shin 
(1998) compare cases (ii) and (iii), but they do not consider stock pollution effects. 
Moreover their analysis is restricted to only three countries. The first restriction is re-
moved in Ulph (2004), who compares all three cases and considers a two period model 
with a stock pollutant. Due to this complication, results are based on simulations and 
conclusions are not always clear-cut. Moreover, regions’ strategy space in the abatem-
ment game is restricted to either ‘no abatement’ or ‘full abatement’,and uncertainty con-
cerns the benefits from global abatement, with only two states (low and high benefits) 
and uncertainty is correlated between players. This means that in the case of learning all 
countries are also ex-post identical; either all countries are low or high benefit countries. 
Kolstad (2007) adopts the same set of assumptions, but considers a flow pollutant. In this 
case the unambiguous result is that when comparing case (i) and (iii), learning increases 
the size of a stable ICA but has a negative impact on global welfare, as proven in Kol-
stad and Ulph (2006). Case (ii) is ambiguous; learning may have a positive or negative 
impact on participation and welfare. Finally, in the case of uncorrelated uncertainty, Kol-
stad and Ulph (2006) confirm the negative impact of learning, but again have to resort to 
simulation, despite the assumption that all countries are ex-ante identical and that there 
are only two states in the world. Dellink et al. (2008) formulate a stochastic version of 
the STACO model to test the theoretical results in an applied setting. They find that in 
most cases learning has indeed a negative impact, but this is always the case. Further-
more, they illustrate that a stochastic approach can shed much more light on the stability 
of coalitions than a deterministic setting. 
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2.3.5 Renegotiations 
Examining renegotiations seems important for at least two different reasons. First, the 
commitment period 2008-2012 agreed in the Kyoto protocol is closing in a few years 
time and, hence, there is a need to take a look beyond. Secondly, the prospect of renego-
tiations at a later stage changes the incentives to join a coalition at earlier stages and, 
therefore, changes the negotiation results. The issue is to examine whether renegotiations 
hamper or help the formation of stable coalitions: whether renegotiations lead to agree-
ments with higher or lower abatement targets. The Conference of Parties meetings of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) clearly illustrate 
that negotiating GHG emission controls is a process rather than a matter of striking an 
agreement. Hence, the formation of an ICA is probably best understood in a sequential 
game framework.  
In the theoretical literature on games of coalition formation Bloch (1996), Ray and 
Vohra (2001) and Konishi and Ray (2003) have developed such sequential models. 
These modelling approaches, being general and highly abstract, have not yet found their 
way into applied work. From an applied modelling perspective the theoretical literature 
on international environmental agreements suffers from a serious drawback. It is gener-
ally assumed that countries are identical and coalitions can be fully characterised by the 
number of participating countries. Barrett (1994 and 1999) considers an infinitely re-
peated game. Contrary to what a folk theorem would suggest, full participation cannot 
generally be achieved because the option to renegotiate limits the threats of punishment. 
Asheim et al. (2006) use a similar model but allow for regional agreements. The finding 
is that several regional agreements increase GHG abatement over one global agreement 
but, again, full participation is not achieved. Ulph (2004) and Rubio and Ulph (2007) 
have studied renegotiations of international environmental agreements with a stock pol-
lutant. They find that as the gains from cooperation increase over time, participation de-
clines. This reinforces Barrett’s (1994) findings. In a recent paper de Zeeuw (2008) con-
siders farsighted stability in a dynamic membership game and finds small as well as 
large stable coalitions. However, all these approaches are confined to symmetric coun-
tries and do not capture abatement cost differences and the impact of transfers to stabi-
lise agreements.  
Using the STACO model that comprises 12 heterogeneous regions Weikard, Dellink and 
van Ierland (2007) and Weikard and Dellink (2008) have explored the impact of renego-
tiations. They argue that, because fossil fuels are finite, ICA renegotiations are a finite 
game and punishment strategies can be effective. Weikard and Dellink (2008) have 
adapted the optimal transfer rule (see section 2.3.1) to make it applicable in a setting 
with renegotiations. They find that a grand coalition may be stabilised in early committ-
ment periods.  
2.3.6 Summary of findings from the STACO research: 
Table 2.2 summarises findings from the STACO model for various scenarios. The “Per-
centage gap closure” last column is the percentage of the possible welfare gains that the 
best stable coalition (in a given scenario) achieves. The grand coalition, which is usually 
unstable would close the gap by 100 percent.    
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Table 2.2.  Summary of best performing stable coalitions under various policy options.  
Scenario / Policy Coalition Percentage gap closure
None All singletons 0 
Permit tradinga),f) EU-15, China 24 
Optimal sharing b) USA, EET, CHN, IND, DAE 46 
Majority voting c) FSU, Brazil, ROW 4.2 
Unanimity voting c) China, EEX 5.6 
Exogenous technological change d), 
no transfers 
JPN, EU-15 3.5 
Exogenous technological change d), 
optimal transfers 
USA, EET, EEX,CHN, IND 44.5 
Endogenous technological change e), 
optimal transfers 
EU-15, EET,CHN, IND, DAE 44.8 
Renegotiations with optimal sharing 
(2 periods) b) 
All but EU, after 30 years: 
USA, EET, CHN, IND, 
DAE 
62 
   
a) Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus (2006) 
b) Weikard and Dellink (2008) 
c) Finus, Altamirano-Cabrera and van Ierland (2005)  
d) Nagashima and Dellink (2008) 
e) Nagashima and Weikard (2009) 
f) Nagashima et al. (2009) 
2.3.7 Summary of issues for further research: 
(i) Given the possibility to renegotiate, will countries join an ICA all at once or 
would there be a sequence of accessions?  
(ii) Can ICAs consisting of a small number of countries contribute to mitigation by 
taking a lead in shaping policies and policy instruments, and to what extent? 
Does a leader-follower negotiation structure generate smaller or larger coalitions, 
less or more successful emissions control? This is of particular importance given 
the possibility of rapid climate change and a potential urgency to take action. 
(iii) Will the possibility of renegotiations lead to larger coalitions because members 
hope to improve their stakes in the future without making long-term commit-
ments in the present; or rather to smaller coalitions because renegotiations open 
the option to "wait and see"?  
(iv) How does uncertainty and learning impact the coalition formation process? What 
is the precise nature of the tradeoff between uncertain benefits from early abate-
ment and improved abatement decisions at a later stage?  
(v) How are equilibrium abatement paths affected by the possibility to renegotiate 
and by the possibility of sequential accessions? What are the implications for 
climate change related damages and welfare. 
(vi) The results obtained by answering these questions will be useful to evaluate pol-
icy options on the national and EU-level such as, e.g.  
(vii) Is it better to negotiate a global agreement or rather (several) small bilateral 
agreements (e.g. EU-China)? 
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(viii) What is the role of side-payments (direct transfers or distribution of tradable 
emission permits) in the formation of ICAs in a framework of sequential acces-
sions? 
(ix) How can emission rights be assigned to improve stability under sequential acces-
sion? 
2.4 Alternative stability concepts 
So far little work has been done to systematically explore alternative solution concepts in 
the context of IEA games. There are two main alternatives. The first is to consider multi-
ple deviations, the second is to consider a deviator’s concern about best responses of 
others to a deviation. We briefly explain both ideas below.    
(i) Multiple deviations: It is reasonable to assume that players can coordinate their 
strategies in a negotiation process. Hence, if it pays for a subgroup of players to deviate 
collectively, the considered strategy profile is not coalition proof. Bernheim et al. (1987) 
and Farrell and Maskin 1989) develop a concept coalition proof equilibrium. Because of 
its complexity this concept has not in applied to ICAs in any published work.      
(ii) Farsightedness: A Nash equilibrium is characterised by the fact that deviations do not 
pay given that others stick to their strategy. However, a player considering a deviation 
should also take other’s reaction into account. A farsightly stable equilibrium recognises 
this. It is assumed that a deviation would only occur if it is beneficial to the deviator 
when other play best responses to the deviation (Chwe 1994, de Zeeuw 2008). 
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3. Quickscan of Integrated Assessment Models 
The multifaceted aspect of climate change makes it a fascinating, but complex issue to 
study. Climate change is a global issue that stretches across borders, scientific disciplines 
and time. It involves many interrelated processes each belonging to a different discipline. 
Human processes create Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions; atmospheric, oceanic and bio-
logical processes link emissions to atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. Climatic and radia-
tive processes link these concentrations to the climate. Finally economic, ecological and 
socio-political processes link the changed climate to valued impacts and policies. 
To comprehend the whole issue at hand these different disciplines need to be combined 
in a comprehensive manner. Integrated assessment was developed to fulfil this need and 
advise policy and decision making. The third assessment report (IPCC, 2001) defines in-
tegrated assessment as: “an interdisciplinary process of combining, interpreting, and 
communicating knowledge from diverse scientific disciplines in such a way that the 
whole set of cause-effect interactions of a problem can be evaluated”. IAMs attempt to 
advance understanding by constructing a formal representation, i.e. a model. IAMs can be 
divided into two broad categories: policy evaluation models, also known as simulation 
models, and policy optimisation models (Weyant et al., 1995).  
3.1 Quickscan of existing Integrated Assessment Models 
To facilitate the selection of suitable candidate models for a coalition formation analysis, 
several key criteria are identified to evaluate the models. First, only global models or models 
including several regions that together represent the globe are included. That is, specific re-
gional models are not considered as their results would be of limited applicability for our 
purposes. 
Secondly, the model should include monetised damages from climate change. By monetis-
ing damages the effects of the economy on climate change and the effects of climate change 
on the economy are linked. The advantage of such IAMs is that they can deal with important 
issues such as the efficient allocation of abatement burdens and accepted damages, by speci-
fying the costs and benefits of various abatement strategies. Moreover, one can analyse what 
the optimal climate strategy (mitigation) should be, by trading off the damages due to cli-
mate change and mitigation costs. 
Thirdly, the model selected should be contemporary. That is, it should be a model that is still 
actively used and reasonably up to date with new estimates in the literature. Many models 
are outdated or are no longer being worked on. 
Table 2.1 shows an overview of 30 prominent IAMs. Their scale is given and whether they 
are still actively used. The damage functions are reviewed. In the table PU denotes physical 
units and refers to damages functions that are not monetised. MON refers to monetised dam-
age functions. These are monetised based on literature, N refers to Nordhaus (1994), T refers 
to Tol (1996a), F refers to Fankhauser (1995), H refers to Hertel (1993) and D&M refers to 
Dowlabadati and Morgan(1993). Finally the models are characterised as optimisation mod-
els (OP) or evaluation models (EV).  
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Table 3.1  Overview of Integrated Assessment Models. 
Model  Regions Active Damage module Literature  Type 
AD-DICE GLOBAL A MON based on N  De Bruin et al 2009 OP 
AIM countries/grid I PU Morita et al (1994) EV 
AS/Exm GLOBAL I MON Lempert et al (1996) EV 
CETA GLOBAL I MON adjusted from N/F Peck and Teisberg (1992) OP 
Connecti-
cut 
GLOBAL I MON based on N  Yohe and Wallace (1995) OP 
CSERGE GLOBAL I MON based on F Maddison (1995) OP 
DIAM GLOBAL I MON Chapuis et al (1995) OP 
DICE GLOBAL A MON based on N  Nordhaus(1994) OP 
FAIR 17 regions A MON based on N  den Elzen et al. (2007) EV 
FARM 8 regions I PU and MON based on 
H 
  
FUND 16 regions A MON based on T Tol (2005) OP 
ICLIPS  I Tolerable window ap-
praoch 
Bruckner et al (2003) EV 
ICAM continent/coun ? MON based on D&M Dowlatabadi and Morgan 
(1995) 
EV 
IIASA GLOBAL I none WEC/IIASA (1995) OP 
IMAGE Grid A PU Alcamo(1994) EV 
MAGICC  I none Wigley et al (1993) EV 
MARIA GLOBAL/conti ? MON based on F Mori (1995) OP 
MERGE continental A MON adjusted from N Manne et al (1995) OP 
MiniCAM countries/grid ? MON based on Manne 
et al 
 EV? 
MIT/EPPA countries/grid A none MIT(1994),Reilly (2005) EV 
PAGE continent/coun A MON based on 
CRU/ERL/F/T 
Hope et al. (1993) EV 
PEF continent/coun I PU Cohan et al (1994) EV 
PGCAM  I PU  EV? 
PROCAM countries/grid I MON based on Manne 
et al 
Edmonds et al (1994) EV 
RICE continental I* MON based on N  Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) OP 
SLICE continental I MON based on N  Kolstad (1996) OP? 
STACO 12 regions A MON based on N, T, F Finus et al. (2006) OP 
TARGETS GLOBAL I ? Rotmans (1995) EV 
WAGEM 11 regions A none Kemfert (2005) OP 
WITCH 12 Regions A MON based on N  Bosello (2000) OP 
 Note: * Nordhaus does have plans to update RICE, but the currently available version is out-
dated and therefore the model is labelled as “inactive”. 
Looking at models that fulfil the previously described criteria we see that there are 6 candi-
dates: FAIR, FUND, MERGE, PAGE, STACO, and WITCH. PAGE does not deal with coalition for-
mation issues; STACO has been discussed extensively above. The other models are dis-
cussed in more details below. 
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3.2 Coalition formation in existing IAMs 
The Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation and Distribution (FUND) was devel-
oped in Tol (1996b). FUND is one of the few IAMs that includes an extensive impact module. 
Impacts are monetised for several impact sectors. Tol (2001) uses an “analytically tractable 
approximation” of the FUND model to derive incentives of regions to cooperate. 
Kemfert (2004) and Kemfert, Lise and Tol (2004) use the WAGEM model to investigate 
coalition formation. WAGEM does not contain a full damage module, and therefore the 
analysis is restricted to scenarios where coalition members realize pre-determined 
Kyoto-type targets. Babiker ( 2001) adopts a similar strategy to overcome the absence of 
damage estimates in the MIT-EPPA model. 
WITCH (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model) and it predecessor, FEEM-RICE, 
were developed by the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Climate Change Modelling 
and Policy Research Programme (Bosetti et al., 2006). This optimal growth model has been 
developed with the aim of studying policies for climate change control. It contains 12 world 
regions. The damage function is adopted from Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). A full stability 
analysis is not possible with WITCH, or at least has never been carried out. Rather, Buchner 
and Carraro (2007) restrict the analysis to a few given coalition structures and compare the 
payoffs of regions for these. 
3.3 Identifying suitable IAMS for coalition formation analysis 
As mentioned above, the models should contain marginal abatement costs and marginal 
damage costs for several world regions, and should not be outdated. While there are sev-
eral suitable candidates, only one existing model, STACO, is currently able to deal with 
coalition formation and stability. 
The analysis of the current attempts to study coalition formation in IAMS reveals that 
the models all compromise on some essential elements: STACO reduces the underlying 
economic model to just a payoff function; FUND is approximated by a simple analytical 
model; WITCH excludes stability analysis and MIT/EPPA and WAGEM have exoge-
nous reduction targets (as they do not contain a full damage module). 
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4. Prospects for coalition formation in FAIR and MERGE 
4.1 Basic setup of the FAIR model4 
The extended FAIR 2.1 model consists of 17 world regions; USA, OECD-Europe Eastern 
Europe, Japan, Oceania, FSU, Central America, South America, Middle East and Turkey, 
East Asia (incl. China) South-East Asia, Northern Africa, Southern Africa, Western Africa, 
Eastern Africa and South Asia. 
Furthermore, it integrates the following sub-modules:  
1. The emissions pathway module, calculating the multi-gas emission pathways;  
2. The climate module, calculating temperature implications of greenhouse gas emis-
sions.  
The MAGICC 4.1 climate model (Wigley, 2003; Wigley & Raper, 2001, 2002) is used for to 
calculate radiative forcing and temperature increase. The MAGICC model allows exploring 
the impact of different settings of the climate sensitivity, i.e. the equilibrium global mean 
surface temperature increase due to a doubling of pre-industrial atmospheric CO2.  For al-
ternative calculations either the UNFCCC-ACCC climate model or the IRF functions based on 
simulation experiments with various Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Models 
(AOGCMs) can be used, e.g. Den Elzen et al. (2002), Den Elzen et al. (1999) and Den Elzen 
and Schaeffer (2002). 
3. The abatement cost module, combined with a simple macroeconomic growth model 
for calculating the GDP losses as a result of abatement. To calculate the abatement 
costs for each region Marginal Abatement Cost curves (MACs) are used. Using the 
emissions targets of the regimes over the different regions and a least-cost approach. 
The model calculates the tradable emission permits, the international permit price 
and the total abatement costs up to 2030, with or without emission trading. 
MAC curves reflect the additional costs of abating a unit of GHG emissions and are used to 
derive permit supply and demand curves under different regulation schemes in any emission 
trading market using the same methodology as Ellerman and Decaux (1998) and Criqui et 
al. (1999). These schemes could include constraints on imports and exports of emission per-
mits, non-competitive behaviour, transaction costs associated with the use of emissions trad-
ing, less than fully efficient supply (related to the operational availability of viable CDM pro-
jects) and the banking of surplus emission allowances. 
4. The burden-sharing module calculates the distribution of mitigation costs for differ-
ent allocation regimes. 
                                                   
4  Based on information provided by Andries Hof, MNP. 
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4.2 Possibilities and bottlenecks for coalition formation and stability 
analysis in FAIR 
FAIR is different than most models discussed above because it is a simulation (evalua-
tion) model, and not an optimization model. In principle, when first order conditions for 
optimal actions are specified, and when these are independent of other variables, simula-
tion models can also assess the consequences of optimal actions, but the model is not di-
rectly aimed at this.  
A major drawback of FAIR for climate-economy analysis is its lack of a general equilib-
rium framework. The model misses the general equilibrium feedback mechanisms that 
have revealed to be important in top-down assessments of the costs of climate policies. 
For instance, in FAIR there is no impact of the policies on relative prices, and thus the 
reactions of producers and consumers to the changed circumstances can only be roughly 
approximated. This may especially be problematic when more far-reaching climate poli-
cies are investigated, i.e. for larger coalitions, as the general equilibrium effects will be 
more pronounced there. When payoffs from climate policies and coalition formation are 
based on costs and benefits as projected by FAIR, only a first-order approximation can 
be given, and important indirect effects that are present in most IAMs cannot be taken 
into account. 
From a technical perspective, there may be some complications due to a mismatch be-
tween the software used for FAIR and STACO. Given the relatively simple nature of the 
underlying mathematical model, this complication should however not pose critical 
problems. Obviously, a substantial effort may be needed for the researcher(s) involved in 
the integration to become acquainted with both software languages. 
One of the major strengths of the FAIR model is its flexibility with respect to the input 
data: compared to most models, it is very easy to switch between different marginal 
abatement cost or damage estimates. Furthermore, this set-up of the FAIR model fits 
very nicely with the STACO approach, and facilitates the integration of both models. 
STACO assumes a simple, linear relation between global abatement efforts and avoided 
damages. This simplicity allows the model to directly link the costs and benefits of 
abatement and express a single function for payoffs as a function of regional and global 
abatement efforts. Thus, assessments made with the FAIR model can be used to change 
the payoff functions of STACO. This allows for a thorough robustness analysis of the 
payoff function used in STACO, and thus for an enhanced insight into the drivers of coa-
litional stability. 
Because the determination of payoffs and the stability assessment can be separated, a 
major first step can be taken by using FAIR to project abatement efforts and payoff func-
tions for all possible coalition structures. These can be stored in a database for all possi-
ble coalition structures, and the stability of coalitions can then be assessed using the ex-
isting STACO stability assessment module. The revision of this STACO module to read 
payoffs from a database rather than directly from the other STACO module is rather 
straightforward.  
In this first step, exogenous decisions need to be assumed with respect to the division of 
abatement efforts over regions (in the FAIR emission pathway module) and the financial 
transfers between coalition members (in the FAIR burden-sharing module). Thus, the 
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more advanced features of STACO, including the concept of optimal transfers, cannot be 
included in this step. Note also that in this stage a consistent comparison with the origi-
nal STACO code is not feasible, as this approach does not entail full welfare maximiza-
tion of the different regions, but rather fixed abatement targets.  
A second step may involve the construction of a new module to integrate the stability as-
sessment into the FAIR framework: the only restriction is that the software that is used is 
relatively efficient in doing a large number of comparisons in a big database/matrix.  It is 
unlikely that the software used for FAIR will pose any problems in this respect. 
Finally, further revisions of the FAIR model to allow more complex optimization rou-
tines would be useful for more realistic and advanced model simulations, such as renego-
tiations and optimal transfers. Such efforts should be coordinated with other projects at 
MNP on the further development of FAIR. Separate research at MNP in collaboration 
with Wageningen University and the Institute for Environmental Studies of VU Univer-
sity Amsterdam (IVM-VU) to include adaptation costs into the FAIR model, and plans at 
Wageningen University to include adaptation costs into the STACO model, may present 
an excellent opportunity to create synergies between these different activities. The stra-
tegic aspects of adaptation make this extension of the model very interesting: adaptation 
can be regarded as a private response to climate change (with local benefits), whereas 
abatement (mitigation) is a public response in the sense that it creates global benefits. 
4.3 Basic setup of the MERGE model 
MERGE, “A Model for Estimating the Regional and Global Effects of greenhouse gas reduc-
tions”, is an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the global economy.  We investigate 
the MERGE 5.1 version available online (http://www.stanford.edu/group/MERGE/). The 
world is divided into 9 geo-political regions: (1) USA, (2) Western Europe, (3) Japan, (4) 
Canada, Australia and New Zeeland, (5) Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, (6) 
China, (7) India, (8) Mexico and OPEC countries and (9) the rest of the world. Each regional 
economy is modelled as a Ramsey model of optimal long-term growth (Manne and Richels, 
2000). Discounted utility is maximized and output is a function of capital, labour and energy 
inputs. Energy is divided into electric and non electric energy. Separate technologies are de-
fined for each source of electric energy. Each region has a consumption and savings choice. 
Investments are equal to savings and build up the capital stock. Emissions translate into 
global concentrations which in turn impact mean global indicators such as temperature 
change. MERGE is calibrated to the base year 2000. The model uses 10-year intervals. The 
model can find the optimal policy but also the most cost-effective way of achieving a policy 
target.  
MERGE includes both market and non-market damages of climate change. Market damages 
include such damages as agricultural losses, coastal erosion etc. whereas non-market dam-
ages include species losses, human health and catastrophic risk. Generally high income re-
gions are willing to pay more to avoid these damages than low income regions. Market 
damages are implemented such that they reduce output that is available for consumption and 
savings. MERGE focuses also on non-market damages. This relation is assumed to be quad-
ratic and the authors acknowledge that the parameter estimates for non-market damages are 
highly speculative due to the uncertainties involved. One peculiarity of the MERGE model 
deserves mention here: the market damages as assessed by MERGE are approximated as a 
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percentage of GDP in the Business-as-Usual scenario, and there is no feedback from a 
change in GDP as a result of damages or abatement costs on the level of damages. This lack 
of feedback implies a small overestimation of damages (as climate change is likely to lower 
GDP levels), but facilitates the numerical solution of the model. Note furthermore that the 
MERGE team are intending to update the damage module of their model using more recent 
insights from e.g. Richard Tol (Geoffrey Blanford, personal communication February 2008). 
A limited number of internationally uniform goods can be traded across regions. Trade in 
oil, gas energy intensive sectors and carbon emissions can be traded in various versions of 
this model. MERGE contains carbon emission coefficients for both current and prospective 
future technologies. Some of these technologies such as nuclear and hydroelectric energy 
create no emissions. Non-electric energy sources all cause emissions. MERGE also considers 
that oil and gas reserves are limited. Non-energy emissions of GHGs are also included such 
as methane from agriculture. Climate change is summarized by a change in global mean 
temperature. The emissions-radiation link is summarized according to the IPCC guidelines. 
4.4 Possibilities and bottlenecks for coalition formation and stability 
analysis in MERGE 
The MERGE model can handle two types of solution concepts: (i) the Pareto optimum, 
and (ii) exogenous targets. In the first approach, marginal abatement costs are weighed 
against marginal damages to find the optimal level of climate emission control.  
The outcome of the optimisation routine is labelled the “efficient allocation”. This is, 
however, not identical to a full joint welfare maximization. Rather, Negishi weights are 
used to provide a market equilibrium. Equalisation of marginal abatement costs across 
regions is then taken care of through unlimited trading of emission permits. The main 
reason for this approach is that if full joint welfare maximization would be adopted, the 
analysis of climate change policy would be clouded with effects caused by the different 
levels of development of regions. Keller et al. (2003) put it as follows: “The Negishi 
weights are an instrument to account for regional disparities in economic develop-
ment. They equalize the marginal utility of consumption in each region for each pe-
riod in order to prevent large capital flows between regions. This technique is de-
scriptive rather than prescriptive; although the choice of utility function implies that 
such capital flows would greatly improve social welfare, without the Negishi weights 
the problem of climate change would be drowned by the vastly larger problem of un-
derdevelopment. A detailed exposition of Negishi weights is given in Nordhaus and 
Yang (1996) and the references cited therein.” As marginal utilities differ between re-
gions, a financial transfer from a rich to a poor region would increase utility in that re-
gion more (in terms of global social welfare) than that it would reduce utility in the do-
nor region. Thus, full joint welfare maximization would generate huge financial transfers 
across the world until marginal utilities are equalised; this is prevented by using Negishi 
weights. 
At first sight, this limited optimization routine may conflict with the assumption of joint 
welfare maximization of coalitions as used in the game-theoretical models, including 
STACO. However, one should realise that model such as STACO only specify costs and 
benefits from climate policy. The larger issue of underdevelopment does not play a role, 
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as the model does not specify a full welfare function. Consequently, in this respect the 
assumptions made in MERGE match the ones made in STACO. 
The complex solution routine in MERGE substantially complicates the possibilities to 
design model simulations with a partial climate agreement. According to Tom Ruther-
ford (personal communication February 2008), it is very hard to design a procedure to 
reflect private cost-benefit behaviour by individual regions. Nonetheless, the behaviour 
of regions that do not participate in the agreement can be approximated through two 
changes in assumptions: (i) permit trading with outsiders is not allowed, and (ii) global 
damages are not taken into account by outsiders. An iterative procedure can then be de-
signed in which the model is solved for the outsiders and the coalition keeping the 
strategies for the other players exogenous. In each simulation, the strategy of one region 
(or the coalition) is updated. The iterations go on until the strategies are mutually consis-
tent. Note that convergence of the model is not guaranteed in this set-up. 
With respect to the second change in assumptions (global damages are not taken into ac-
count by outsiders), it is important to note that the original MERGE model assumes that 
regions that are not participating in international permit trading do not perform a private 
cost-benefit analysis, but rather do no abatement at all. While this may be a reasonable 
assumption for the cases investigated with MERGE so far, this assumption becomes un-
tenable when partial coalitions are assumed: the block of outsider regions reflects a too 
large fraction of global emissions, and the damages to these regions is so substantial that 
the zero-abatement assumption is not realistic. If this restriction of MERGE  can be 
overcome, regional benefits from reduction of local air pollution can also be captured in 
the model. 
Given the outdated nature of the damage function in the MERGE model, it seems sensi-
ble to start the integration of STACO and MERGE by deriving abatement cost functions 
from MERGE simulations analogous to the procedure in Ellerman and Decaux (1998). 
These can then be entered into the existing STACO framework and provide interesting 
insights into the robustness of the STACO model with respect to the specification of 
abatement costs. Note that this first step implicitly simplifies the many interlinkages be-
tween the different regions through international trade in fossil fuels. 
A logical second step is then to derive a benefit function from MERGE by varying 
global abatement levels and calculating regional damage levels. For market damages, 
this is straightforward, as these only depend on the temperature change. For non-market 
damages, a more complicated non-linear function is used, and thus, a pure analytical 
derivation is not possible and numerical simulations are required. 
Taking these two steps together, the MERGE model can also be used to assess the net 
benefits of abatement (i.e. the benefits minus costs, or in STACO terminology the pay-
off) through a construction that is similar to the way the marginal abatement costs are de-
termined in Ellerman and Decaux: for different levels of abatement the model is run (n.b. 
assuming a given rule for financial transfers / a given division of emission permits) and 
the impact on welfare of the region is assessed. A curve can be fitted through the points 
that these different simulations create to reflect the payoff as a function of abatement for 
each region. 
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A more ambitious step towards integration of coalition formation and stability analysis 
in MERGE is to solve MERGE with singletons. This may be computationally hard and 
perhaps some stronger assumptions are required on the order of play (e.g. the coalition 
acts first, the singletons react). Some of these complications are already discussed above. 
Therefore, it makes sense to start this approach by assuming that outsiders do no abate-
ment at all, and change that assumption to a private cost-benefit analysis at a later stage. 
One could start by treating one region as an outsider (that does no abatement) and main-
taining cooperation for all other regions. Using the iterative approach sketched above, 
one can then investigate the computational problems involved (e.g. concerning the speed 
of convergence) before incorporating other partial coalitions. 
The stability assessment can be incorporated in much the same manner as with the FAIR 
model: as the calculation of payoffs is separable from the stability assessment, the pay-
offs for the different regions in a partial coalition can be stored in a database for all pos-
sible coalition structure, and the stability of coalitions can then be assessed using the ex-
isting STACO module. From a technical perspective, this may be preferable over inte-
grating the stability assessment into the MERGE framework, as the GAMS software is 
much less efficient at this type of assessment than the existing Matlab code for STACO; 
existing routines to link GAMS and Matlab can be used for this. As this advantage only 
refers to computational speed, it is of course also possible to implement the stability 
analysis in GAMS.  
Finally, once a model for stability analysis using the MERGE model is operational, full 
advantage can be taken from the richness of the MERGE model. International lnis be-
tween regions at a sectoral level can be exploited to investigate issue linkage and strate-
gic behaviour in the energy markets. A major opportunity for state-of-the-art research is 
provided by the enhanced version of MERGE with local air pollution effect that is con-
structed at MNP. This enhanced model allows the specification of local (private) benefits 
of abatement efforts, where the original MERGE model and original STACO analyses 
only incorporate global (public) benefits from abatement. Not only does this feature im-
prove the cost-benefit assessment of climate policy, it also allows for an investigation 
into the strategic aspects of local versus global environmental policy. It is clear that the 
activities on strategic aspects of adaptation, mentioned in Section 4.2 has some interest-
ing similarities to the local air pollution module, and an investigation in the combination 
of both aspects deserves attention.
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5. Discussion 
This section offers a brief discussion of the prospects for the most relevant future re-
search activities. We also identify major bottlenecks. We close with a preview of a strat-
egy and its potential policy relevance. 
5.1 Research agenda and bottlenecks 
A clear understanding of the incentives associated with different policy options will fa-
cilitate policy-makers who negotiate ICAs. Much of the work on formation and stability 
of ICAs has been either theoretical or based on much simplified assumptions. In order to 
arrive at more reliable assessments stability analysis must be combined with more elabo-
rated climate impact assessment models. Such improved ICA- IAMs could address sev-
eral relevant issues, for example 
• Impacts of leakage – reduction of a abatement efforts as a best response to others 
increased abatement efforts; 
• Impacts of rebound effects – increased energy consumption in some sectors or 
regions as a response to lower energy prices due to increased energy efficiency; 
• Impacts of technological change on the timing of abatement and coalition forma-
tion; 
• The impacts of side-payments (transfers) that can be arranged as 
• Direct payments; 
• Compensation schemes for abatement costs; 
• Issue linking; 
• The impacts of technological cooperation;  
• Allowing for knowledge spillovers;  
• Implementing active R&D cooperation;  
• The impacts of renegotiations. 
To illustrate one particular issue further: Recently, there is substantial interest into the 
consequences of a “delayed accession” of developing countries in a global climate 
agreement. Whereas the current models are suited to investigate the economic conse-
quences of a given accession time frame, they are not capable of answering essential 
questions with respect to the incentives of regions to delay their accession. Thus, they 
work with exogenous scenarios to reflect different assumptions on which countries will 
join an agreement and at which date. The existing game-theoretic models have the major 
flaw that their description of the interactions between the economic system and the cli-
mate system are too simplified to make credible sectoral and regional projections of the 
impacts of climate policies. Integrated coalition formation models, such as the ones pro-
posed here, will be able to provide insights into the changes in incentives of regions over 
time to join a climate agreement by combining the empirical richness of the IAMs with 
the game-theoretic mechanisms as explored in STACO. While many argue that costs and 
benefits will not be the only determinant in international policy-making, they do play a 
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central role in the evaluations that countries make and on which they base their behav-
iour. Furthermore, the quantitative analysis provided by the coalition formation models 
can also be used for a more positive analysis: when should certain regions be stimulated 
to join a coalition and when should a more reactive approach be preferred. 
Several bottlenecks can be identified in the different domains: 
(i) Game theory 
International negotiation processes are complex. In any case a national government or 
groups of governments that link their climate policies (such as EU) need to adopt a posi-
tion, come up with suggestions for cooperation, and perhaps make concessions. More-
over, for a successful negotiation process it is not only necessary to know one’s own 
stakes but also what is at stake for others. It is well-known result from bargaining theory 
that asymmetric information for example about others’ payoffs may lead to inefficient 
bargaining outcomes. The inclusion of uncertainties as well as asymmetric information is 
a major challenge for applied modelling.  
Another issue is the existence of multiple equilibria. Generally, with multiple equilibria, 
some equilibrium is best for one player while another equilibrium is best for another 
player. This gives rise to non-trivial equilibrium selection problems.  
(ii) Integrated Assessment modelling  
Regionalised IAMs provide an insight into what is at stake for different coun-
tries/regions. As such they provide an informational basis for the negotiation process.  
Stability analysis of the kind a combined STACO-MERGE or STACO-FAIR model 
would offer is important input for policy-makers/negotiators. Analysis of different model 
variants unveils the incentives of different regions to participate in an agreement. This 
may facilitate the search for strategic alliances in climate policy negotiations.     
(iii) Data requirements 
The quality of results from IAMs always depends on the available data. As data are al-
ways incomplete or due measurement error, uncertainty analysis remains an issue for 
IAMs (see Gabbert and Kroeze (2004) for a survey).  The analyses with STACO have 
revealed that regional damage estimates are especially important for the determination of 
regional payoffs, and therefore for the stability of coalitions (see Dellink et al., 2008 for 
an econometric investigation into this issue). Unfortunately, good regional damage esti-
mates are not always available, and the quality of the estimates is often poor. While scat-
tered evidence is available on the impact of specific climate impacts for specific regions, 
fully integrated assessments of all impacts for all regions are very scarce (most models 
use the damage estimates of the RICE model, but these have been estimated already 10 
years ago, and thus do not reflect recent insights). 
(iv) Computations 
The most interesting policy questions arise around the issue of timing of abatement 
measures and accession to an ICA. This involves the analysis of sequential games that 
can be computationally too demanding.  
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Similarly models with endogenous technological change will usually involve optimal 
control problems in a strategic setting, i.e. differential games the solution of which may 
require huge computing capacities.  
5.2 Preview of a research strategy 
FAIR can relatively easily be used to (i) update the abatement cost and benefit functions 
in STACO; (ii) do stability assessments in FAIR for non-optimal regimes; (iii) Further 
research is required before partial coalition formation can be fully integrated into FAIR. 
MERGE’s damage module is not fully up to date but it might be updated ‘soon’. A full 
integration of MERGE and STACO seems to be difficult. A pragmatic approach would 
suggest to revise STACO’s benefits and cost functions using results from MERGE.  
As a final remark we wish to stress some potential policy implications of the efforts to 
combine game theoretic stability analysis with Integrated Assessment modelling.  
• Use of transfers – these may be large. Hence, good communication with the public is 
needed to explain the needs and purposes of transfers;  
• Shaping of industrial policies with respect to green technologies; 
• Restriction of technology spillovers to members of an ICA can have negative stabil-
ity impacts. 
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